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 I. Introduction 
 In 2010 we published a collaborative article in which we showed how the judiciary 
in three Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries reacted to the institu-
tional changes that were made in these countries at the end of the 1990s and the 
beginning of the 2000s. 1 In that article we set out the results of an analysis of over 
1000 judgments passed by Polish, Czech and Hungarian administrative courts in 
the years between 1999 and 2004, particularly the types of arguments orvalues 
referred to by the judges in the judgments. 
 Our analysis led to the conclusion that the respective judiciaries did not change 
their adjudicating method in the years in question despite signifi cant changes in the 
legal environment, particularly the new Constitutions of the 1990s, pre-accession 
commitments and accession itself. One of the features of judicial adjudications 
in the period in question is an unswerving reliance on formal law values 2 such 
 *   The authors would like to thank all the participants of the conference  ‘ Central European Judges 
under the EU Infl uence: The Transformative Power of Europe Revised on the 10th Anniversary of the 
Enlargement ’ , Florence, 12 – 13 May 2014, for their insightful comments to this chapter. Our special 
thanks go also to the members of our research team for their invaluable assistance in the research: 
 Á gnes Kov á cs, Krisztina Ficsor, Zsolt Gondola, Olga Papp, Zs ó fi a Zsoldics, Bart ł omiej Osieka, Szymon 
 Ł ajszczak, Aleksandra Orze ł , Tomasz Kwiatkowski, Krzysztof Kumala and Bart ł omiej D ę bski. 
 1  M  Matczak ,  M  Bencze and  Z  K ü hn ,  ‘ Constitutions, EU Law and Judicial Strategies in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland ’ ( 2010 )  30  Journal of Public Policy  81 . 
 2  In this article we use the terms  ‘ value ’ and  ‘ argument ’ interchangeably. This is, in our view, rea-
sonable, as we understand a law value (eg a EU law value) as a state of affairs stipulated by that law 
(eg free fl ow of goods and services) and an argument as affi rmation of the need to implement the state 
of affairs set out by a judge in a judgment. We deem that for the purpose of our deliberations this inter-
changeable use of these terms is fully justifi ed and does not give rise to confusion. 
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as a linguistic interpretation of a legal text and references to earlier judgments. 
Moreover, judges did not show any increased interest in constitutional values 
or EU law values despite these values having been introduced to the normative 
systems of each country by the legislators, or in values or arguments such as tele-
ological or functional interpretations. 
 As we characterised the criticised judicial method as  formalistic adjudication 
it is crucial to clarify what we exactly mean by the term  ‘ formalism ’ and what are 
the consequences of applying this approach. Formalism is often depicted as the 
 ‘ most-locally-applicable-rule ’ approach in deciding a legal case 3 or  ‘ bound ’ judi-
cial decision making. 4 At the most general level this means that practitioners try 
to solve a given legal problem by relying only on a limited set of arguments such as 
the above-mentioned text of the law, earlier cases, accepted legal doctrines and tra-
ditional interpretative methods  without taking into consideration the wider social 
and legal context of the case. The judge presents the decision as a  simple logical 
deduction from the general legal standards, as if no substantive value judgements 
have been added. 5 
 This model represents a kind of judicial self-understanding to remain loyal to 
traditional legal ideology, which according to many lawyers serves best the idea 
of the rule of law. The other justifying principle of formalism is the separation 
of powers which requires a clear differentiation between the competence of the 
 legislator and that of the judge. A judge therefore can back the judgment exclu-
sively by those arguments which come from the legislative bodies or which are at 
least accepted by them. 
 For a better understanding of what formalism is we can contrast it with two 
other judicial approaches, namely the Dworkinian and the pragmatist model. The 
Dworkinian approach generally takes into consideration (besides the text of the 
law and previous precedents) the justifying moral and political principles of law in 
adjudication (wider legal context of cases). 6 Pragmatism, on the contrary, does not 
 3  F  Schauer ,  ‘ Formalism ’ ( 1988 )  97  Yale Law Journal  509, 519 . 
 4  J  Wr ó blewski ,  The Judicial Application of Law ( Kluwer Law ,  1992 ) . 
 5  Martin Stone, for instance, found in legal scholarship at least seven varieties of formalism. See 
 M  Stone ,  ‘ Formalism ’ in  J  Coleman and  S  Shapiro (eds),  The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and 
Philosophy of Law ( Oxford University Press ,  2002 )  166 – 205, 170 . cf also  R  Siltala ,  A Theory of Precedent. 
From Analytical Positivism to a Post-Analytical Philosophy of Law ( Hart Publishing ,  2000 )  50 . Siltala 
distinguishes fi ve basic modes of formalism: 1) Constitutive formality (the formal relation of legal 
standard to its source, which gives the standard ideally a binary code valid/non-valid); 2) systemic 
formality, defi ned by internal coherence of the legal system and its standards; 3) mandatory formal-
ity, which relates to the formal binding force of the source of law (binary code binding/non-binding); 
4) structural formality, which relates to the degree of closeness of operative facts of the rule (high 
degree of formalism relates to concrete clear rule); 5) methodological formality, which places emphasis 
on a literal reading of the law. Our analysis primarily deals with the last sense of formalism in Siltala ’ s 
understanding, though it relates to other notions of formalism as well. 
 6  R  Dworkin , The Moral Reading of the Constitution (1996), online at  < http://www.nybooks.
com/articles/archives/1996/mar/21/the-moral-reading-of-the-constitution/?page=1 > , last visited  1 
December 2014 . 
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care much about the underlying moral principles. Pragmatist judges hold it more 
important to adequately refl ect social needs behind the law (wider social context 
of the case). Several representatives of the pragmatist approach have a clear con-
cept of the social function of law that adjudication should serve. 7 
 Nonetheless, moderate use of formalist approach has its own advantages. 
Legal certainty and predictability are core elements of modern law, thus formalist 
decision making reduces the risks of social actions. This has been, perhaps, best 
explained by Max Weber, according to whom 
 [j]uridical formalism enables the legal system to operate like a technically rational 
machine. Thus it guarantees to individuals and groups within the system a relative maxi-
mum of freedom, and greatly increases for them the possibility of predicting the legal 
consequences of their actions. Procedure becomes a specifi c type of pacifi ed contest, 
bound to fi xed and inviolable  ‘ rules of games ’ . 8 
 However, excessive formalism makes the law very rigid and infl exible, therefore 
formalistic adjudication loses its connection to the moral and political values as 
well as the social needs which the law should otherwise serve. 
 In order to refi ne further this general picture we have to introduce a distinc-
tion between  ‘ honest ’ and  ‘ strategic ’ judicial formalism. 9 The former represents a 
judicial attitude to remain loyal to the text of the law, to the accepted legal doc-
trines and to the traditional interpretive methods at any cost. Although this judi-
cial strategy works well in  ‘ easy ’ or  ‘ routine ’ cases, in  ‘ hard ’ cases where the law is 
uncertain the formalist method simply fails: A judge cannot be bound to the text 
of the rule as the applicability of the  ‘ most local rule ’ itself becomes questionable 
in diffi cult cases. 
 If a judge insists on presenting her or his argumentation as a logical deduction 
and denies that political, moral, social or other choices should be involved in any 
legal decision making even in hard cases, 10 she or he has to use the other (strategic) 
version of formalism. Under these circumstances formalism may function as a 
 ‘ camoufl age ’ of a hidden agenda of the judge. The judge ’ s decision cannot be 
deduced from the traditional legal arguments that she or he presents in his or her 
opinion. The judge may be fully aware of this fact, but the judgment, seemingly, 
is based on appropriate and relevant legal reasons. As a consequence of applying 
this strategy the judge cannot be subject to the criticism of taking decisions based 
on illegitimate reasons. 
 7  RA  Posner ,  ‘ Pragmatic Adjudication ’ ( 1996 )  18  Cardozo Law Review  1 . 
 8  M  Weber,  Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (ed  Max  Rheinstein , trans  E  Shils ) ( Harvard 
University Press ,  1969 ) . 
 9  This distinction is a refl ection on our observation that authors do not always recognize that for-
malist judicial style does not necessarily equal to the rule based decision making. Judges many times 
only pretend that they decide on the basis of the text of the law. In these cases they only justify their 
decision by the text of the law. For a classical example of ignoring this distinction see  HLA  Hart ,  The 
Concept of Law ( Oxford University Press ,  1994 )  124 – 54 . 
 10  Schauer (n 3) 511. 
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 Strategic formalism has a detrimental effect on the quality of judicial practice. 
It prevents the parties and the public audiences from getting to know the real 
considerations driving the judge in the decision making process. The rule of law 
requires that judges explain in a plausible way and in a detailed manner  why they 
decided a case in a certain way. Even if a court decides a case without delay and 
the society is satisfi ed with the result, the lack of refl ective argumentative judicial 
style makes the decision hard to understand and ineligible for observance in sub-
sequent cases. 11 
 Strategic formalism can be plausibly explained by the public choice theory. In 
public choice models judges are players in the fi eld of politics. 12 Courts are not 
only institutions with a special judicial function, but they have their own insti-
tutional goals, they may try to strengthen their political position. The formalist 
strategy may be appropriate to depict the court as a neutral law-applier agency 
which refrains from engaging in discussing hot political issues. 
 In our previous article we identifi ed the probable other causes of formalist 
judicial style, among them the communist legacy, particularly in terms of judicial 
education, a phenomenon known as  ‘ escape into formalism ’ arising from a huge 
workload and a lack of appropriate resources, and also the unwillingness to adju-
dicate based on general standards, arising from concerns over too far-reaching 
judicial discretion. 
 On the tenth anniversary of our countries joining the European Union, we 
have again attempted to analyse how administrative courts in Poland, the Czech 
 Republic and Hungary adjudicate. Applying the same methodology, we ana-
lysed approximately 1000 judgments passed by administrative courts in the years 
between 2005 and 2013. In this chapter we set out the results of the analysis, jux-
taposing it with the previous analysis to illustrate how the style of administrative 
court judges ’ adjudications has altered over the past 15 years. Our aim is to show 
how the extensive institutional changes in Central and Eastern Europe at the turn 
of the century infl uenced judges ’ method of adjudicating and also, more broadly, 
their thought processes and how they see their role. Does the judiciary continue 
to see itself as Montesquieu ’ s  ‘ mouth of the law ’ , bowing down before legal formal-
ism? Or has the enormous load of the general rules and standards that accompa-
nied the new Constitutions and European law forced them to play the Dworkinian 
judge Hercules? We attempt to answer these and other questions in this chapter. 
 We proceed as follows: In the fi rst part, we discuss the research methodology 
applied in both the previous and the current analysis of administrative judicature. 
We then move on to show the results obtained in a manner enabling the 1999 –
 2004 period to be compared with the period 2005 – 2013. In the third part, we 
interpret the results obtained, broken down into countries analysed and  generally. 
 11  See also above,  ch 2 in this volume. 
 12  For an overview of this approach see  A  Dyevre ,  ‘ Unifying the Field of Comparative Judicial Poli-
tics:  Towards a General Theory of Judicial Behaviour ’ ( 2010 )  2  European Political Science Review  304 . 
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In the conclusion to the chapter we try to explain what we can learn from the CEE 
judges ’ behaviour since the turn of the millennium and what lessons can be drawn 
for the future. 
 II. Research Methodology 
 We examined judgments passed in the years 1999 to 2004 and those passed in the 
years 2005 to 2013 applying the same methodology, based to a great extent on a 
quantitative analysis of the types of arguments used by judges in their statements 
of reasons. We assumed that judges could refer in their statements of reasons to 
four types of arguments, which we have also called values: 
 1) Internal law values, 
 2) external law values, 
 3) constitutional values and 
 4) European law values. 
 Having read through the statements of reasons we then drew up an Excel spread-
sheet showing the number and types of references. We included in the fi rst group 
of internal law values the traditional legal arguments used by the judiciary, includ-
ing among others, linguistic interpretations, systemic interpretations, refer-
ences to previous judgments, references to legal doctrine and the application of 
well-known legal themes, for example  argumentum a contrario . We considered 
references to these values to be typical of the traditional model of legal adjudica-
tion in which a judge adjudicates on the basis of relatively clear rules. Reference 
to the values in this group does not require judicial activism or engagement in 
non-legal analyses (for example analyses of the political or economic purpose of 
a given law) or a balancing of rules and standards of a general, ambiguous nature. 
 In the second group, the group of external law values, we included values, any 
reference to which requires a judge to depart from the traditional adjudication 
model in the sense that any reference to these values requires an analysis of the 
effects of political, economic and social factors on the law. We included in the 
group of these values, for example arguments over the purpose or function of a law, 
reference to the public or a private interest, and arguments taking into account the 
social and economic changes made in the judicial environment that a judge deems 
important to the adjudication method. Although some of the values included 
in this second group have a place on the traditional list of legal arguments (for 
example functional interpretation), we deemed that referring to external values 
requires greater judicial activism and has an element about it of balancing values 
that are not present in argumentation based on internal law values. 
 We see the third group, the group of constitutional values, as encompassing 
any argument based on a Constitution, involving both a general reference to 
 constitutional values, rights and principles, and a precise reference to a  specifi c 
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constitutional principle, for example the principle of proportionality or the 
principle of the freedom of enterprise. As references to this group of values are a 
measure of something that can be called judges ’ constitutional awareness, we also 
included in this group pro-constitutional interpretations and particularly direct 
application of the Constitution admissible in some of the countries examined. 
We treated references to constitutional values as evidence of adjudication based 
on standards and the judge ’ s willingness to depart from his or her traditional role, 
characteristic of judges in the communist era. Adjudication using the Constitu-
tion also goes against the formalistic approach, the features of which include a 
conviction that a judge should adjudicate based on the most locally applicable 
rule, which is a refi nement of a more abstract higher ranking principle or a legal 
provision. Consequently, direct application of constitutional principles in legal 
formalism terms is at the least undesirable. 
 The fourth and last group of values covered in a broad sense values of EU law 
(primarily, we mean by  ‘ European law ’ the laws of the EU, but we also refer the 
judgements of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) by this term). In 
this group we included references to provisions of EU law (for example provisions 
of directives), references to EU legal principles (for example some of the funda-
mental freedoms), and also references to European Court of Justice (ECJ) case 
law and general references to the idea of European integration. In the fi rst study 
(1991 – 2004), the values in this group were in some ways similar to constitutional 
values, as judicial references in this period were a sure sign of activism. Although 
during the second study references to EU law values were similar in terms of char-
acter to internal values (for example in the case of highly detailed regulations of 
European tax law), they have to a great extent retained the character of references 
to legal principles and often require values to be balanced. This group of values is 
essential in assessing how the judicial adjudication method has changed as a result 
of EU accession. However, the number of references to the group of external and 
constitutional values could also be interpreted as a measure of how accession has 
indirectly affected judicial behaviour in Central and Eastern Europe, which we will 
try to show in the part dedicated to interpreting the results of our research. 
 As in our previous study, we carried out a quantitative analysis of references to 
the groups of values described above based on  published judgments concerning 
issues  key to business activity . We compiled published judgments based on their 
nature — important, often precedential, cases, that could therefore be treated as 
Dworkinian hard cases. Thus they also comprise an interesting fi eld in which to 
analyse the spectrum of judicial argumentation which in such cases should, at 
least theoretically, be broader than in standard cases. Judgments published are also 
judgments selected for publication by the judiciary itself, so their statements of 
reasons were consequently deemed by judges to be worthy of dissemination. This 
feature has enabled us to state that these judgments refl ect the judiciary ’ s percep-
tion of how a case should be properly and correctly adjudicated. 
 We chose judgments concerning business activity, for example judgments in 
cases involving tax (VAT, excise), licences and concessions, the construction 
 process and highly regulated areas of business activity (pharmaceutical, energy 
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and telecommunications law) as those in which the effect of European integration 
and the new, free market economy system introduced by the Constitution can be 
most clearly seen. 
 In the results given below, we indicate the number of randomly selected judg-
ments that we examined and various confi gurations of the number of references 
and changes to them over time. We particularly show the number of references 
to individual groups, the change in number in each year and also the most fre-
quent combination of references per judgment. Consequently, we are able to form 
several theses as regards changes in the spectrum of values used by judges in 
administrative case law in the countries examined. 
 In this article we do not justify our choice of administrative judgments as sub-
ject of our study (and not judgments in criminal or civil cases, for instance), we 
do not discuss the similarities and differences between how the administrative 
judiciary works in our countries, neither do we discuss the history of institutional 
changes that were made to them at the turn of the century. We refer readers who 
are interested in these issues to our previous article 13 — the considerations therein 
also apply to the current analysis. 
 III. Research Results 
 Below we present the main results of our research for all three countries. 
 Table 1. References to specifi c groups of standards in all examined judgments and 
comparison to the results of the previous analysis — Poland 
 All PL (400) 
 EU Law Topics  Constitutional 
Law Topics 
 Internal 
Values of Law 
 Values External 
to Law 
 Total 
 105  209  1637  231  2182 
 4.8 %  9.6 %  75.0 %  10.6 %  100.0 % 
 1999 – 2004  2005 – 2013  Change 
 EU Law Topics  0.9 %  4.8 %  433.3 % 
 Constitutional Law Topics  7.4 %  9.6 %  29.7 % 
 Internal Values of Law  81.5 %  75.0 %  −8.0 % 
 Values External to Law  10.2 %  10.6 %  3.9 % 
 100.0 %  100.0 % 
 13  Above (n 1). 
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 Table 2. References to specifi c groups of standards in all examined judgments and 
comparison to the results of the previous analysis — Hungary 
 All HU (358) 
 EU Law Topics  Constitutional 
Law Topics 
 Internal 
Values of Law 
 Values External 
to Law 
 Total 
 97  39  799  128  1063 
 9.1 %  3.7 %  75.2 %  12.0 %  100 % 
 1999 – 2004  2005 – 2013  Change 
 EU Law Topics  0.8 %  9.1 %  1037.5 % 
 Constitutional Law Topics  2.5 %  3.7 %  48.0 % 
 Internal Values of Law  87.5 %  75.2 %  −14.06 % 
 Values External to Law  9.3 %  12.0 %  29.03 % 
 100.0 %  100.0 % 
 Table 3. References to specifi c groups of standards in all examined judgments and 
comparison to the results of the previous analysis — Czech Republic 
 All CZ (180) 
 EU Law Topics  Constitutional 
Law Topics 
 Internal 
Values of Law 
 Values External 
to Law 
 Total 
 84  101  852  303  1340 
 6.3 %  7.5 %  63.6 %  22.6 %  100.0 % 
 1999 – 2004  2005 – 2013  Change 
 EU Law Topics  1.6 %  6.3 %  293.75 % 
 Constitutional Law Topics  8.0 %  7.5 %  −6.25 % 
 Internal Values of Law  71.9 %  63.6 %  −11.54 % 
 Values External to Law  18.6 %  22.6 %  21.5 % 
 100.0 %  100.0 % 
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 IV. Interpretation of Results 
 A. Poland 
 The results of an analysis of Polish court judgments are in keeping with the trends 
seen in all three countries examined. Since the period from 1999 to 2004 there 
has been a signifi cant rise in references to EU law arguments (an increase of over 
400 per cent) and a rise in references to constitutional arguments (of nearly 30 
per cent). These increases were accompanied by a fall in the number of references 
to internal arguments (of 8 per cent). Such results, according to the assumptions 
made in the previous study, are clearly signs of deformalisation in the administra-
tive adjudication. We had not encountered this deformalisation in the previous 
study, therefore the current results seem to confi rm our thesis on a delayed impact 
of the institutional changes in CEE on judicial behaviour. 
 In comparison to the Czech Republic and Hungary, Polish judges most fre-
quently interpret internal law in accordance with EU law — the pro-European 
interpretation principle constitutes over 60 per cent of all references to an EU 
law value applied by Polish judges. This phenomenon may be deemed a sign of 
judicial maturity in its approach to the use of EU law and a sign that judgments 
are becoming deformalised, though in the case of Poland it seems to be limited to 
judgments relating to tax and fi nancial law. As already indicated, as opposed to 
automatic citation of particular provisions of EU law, interpreting the provisions 
of domestic law in accordance with EU law is never an action based on simple syl-
logism and as such is a more complex form of argumentation, characteristic of an 
informal manner of adjudicating. 
 An interesting phenomenon that can be seen in citing constitutional values in 
judgments is that Polish judges generally do not make such analyses  ex offi cio . The 
constitutional deliberations made by judges are usually due to the parties ’ attor-
ney, who raise arguments of this type in appeals and consequently, as it were, force 
judges to enhance the spectrum of argumentation applied in a given judgment. 
A similar practice has been present in both Hungarian and Czech jurisdictions. 
 The results for Poland should be interpreted in light of a discussion that took 
place in Poland after the results of the fi rst study for the years 1999 to 2004 were 
published in Poland in 2006. The conclusions of the previous study, and therefore 
the fi ndings regarding far-reaching formalism in administrative court judgments, 
were fi ercely criticised by judges. 14 Administrative court judges questioned both 
the research methodology and the results themselves, taking the stance that the 
statements of reasons for court judgments do not require all the arguments used to 
 14  This criticism was raised particularly by judge B Gruszczy ń ski,  ‘ Czy formalizm orzecze ń s ą d ó w 
oznacza powierzchowne rozpoznanie sprawy? ’ [Does the formalism of administrative judiciary ’ s deci-
sions equate to superfi cial verdicts?] Prawo i Podatki, 2006, nr 4, 23 – 26. 
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 Chart 1:  Trends of frequency of references to specifi c groups of standards between 
1999 and 2013 
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be cited and also that, as constitutional values have been taken into consideration 
by lawmakers while enacting more detailed provisions of law (for example at the 
statutory level), there is no need to consider them in each judgment that applies 
the statutory laws. The current study seems, however, to confi rm the  theory set out 
in the previous analysis, particularly that regarding the delayed effect of the con-
stitutionalisation and Europeanisation of the law on judges ’ actions.  Moreover, the 
qualitative analysis of Polish judgments suggests that the Polish judiciary is taking 
greater care to use deformalised, including constitutional, arguments in judgments 
passed after 2005 and greater sensitivity to the sub-legal effects of judgments. 
 We believe that the discussion on the results of the fi rst study on administra-
tive judiciary that appeared in Poland 15 could play an important role in bringing 
judges ’ attention to the signifi cance of recognising general principles as a valid 
source of judicial argumentation. This approach is clearly illustrated by a quota-
tion from a judgment passed in 2009 by judge B Gruszczy ń ski, one of the most 
active critics of the fi rst study: 
 The axiological aspect of the issue examined is also important. The appellant loses the 
entry made if the court discontinues the proceedings as devoid of purpose  … It has 
been rightly noted in literature that, when a sense of justice deviates far from the desired 
model and is not built up widely in the minds of doctrinal and judicature representatives 
but is forged through the daily procedural reality of entities  … , then an interpretation of 
provisions that leads to the law colliding with generally accepted values, including justice, 
should be avoided. 16 
 The direct reference to general axiological principles that can be seen in the quoted 
verdict is hard to reconcile with the previous position represented by the judges, 
and namely that those principles are already present in the detailed legal pro-
visions and as such do not require any direct application from the judges. It is 
also diffi cult to regard the approach refl ected in the quoted judgment as strongly 
formalistic and from the perspective of a comprehensive examination of cases it 
certainly deserves to be praised. 
 B. Hungary 
 Since the 1 January 2012 Hungary has had a new Constitution ( ‘ Hungarian Fun-
damental Law ’ ) and therefore the structure of administrative courts has slightly 
changed since 1 of January 2013. They have been unifi ed with the labour courts 
and they have been re-organised at a regional level extracting administrative (and 
labour) judges from the professional supervision of Division of Civil Cases of the 
 15  D  Galligan and  M  Matczak ,  Strategie orzekania s ą dowego. O wykonywaniu w ł adzy dyskrecjonal-
nej przez s ę dzi ó w s ą d ó w administracyjnych ( Warszawa ,  2005 ) ;  D  Galligan and  M  Matczak ,  ‘ Formalism 
in Post-Communist Courts. Empirical Study on Judicial Discretion in Polish Administrative Courts 
Deciding Business Cases ’ in  R  Coman and  J-M  De Waele (eds),  Judicial Reforms in Central and Eastern 
European Countries ( Vanden Broele ,  2007 ) . 
 16  Decision of the SN, Case No II GPS 3/09. 
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County Courts which they previously were subject to. This shift aimed at support-
ing the more effi cient work of the affected branches of judicial administration 
(they currently have their own professional leaders who are experts of administra-
tive law; they have trainings and meetings focusing on their own special problems 
etc). Although these changes may have a signifi cant impact on the adjudicative 
quality and style in the long run, they took place only one year before the end of 
the examined period. Thus we do not need to take them into consideration in 
evaluating our research data. 
 Based on the primary quantitative analysis of our data we can see that EU acces-
sion has had a strong direct impact on Hungarian administrative courts, in par-
ticular on the administrative division of the  K ú ria (Hungarian Supreme Court 
or Curia of Hungary). The proportion of references to EU law arguments has 
increased more than 10 times compared to the proportion of EU law references 
made by courts in the period of 1999 to 2004. The huge change in quantity can be 
the sign of change in quality, that is, our data can be interpreted as the fi rst step 
of the Hungarian judiciary departing from the traditional model of adjudication. 
 That hypothesis is supported by two other facts as well. First, we can see an 
almost monotonous increase in the number of references to EU law topics year by 
year between 2005 and 2013 (see chart 3 below). 
 Given the date of the EU accession (2004) these fi gures can demonstrate that 
the Hungarian judiciary has learnt to use EU law as a reasoning tool gradually. 
Step by step acceptance of legal arguments derived from EU law indicates organic, 
 ‘ bottom-up ’ development of judicial practice which may result in a refl ected, well-
reasoned decision making in cases where EU related issues emerge. 
 Second, we are also witnessing a signifi cant increase in the proportion of 
references to constitutional law arguments (48 per cent) and to values external to 
law (29 per cent, see chart 3 below). Although references to values internal to law 
have preserved their prevalence, this dropped more than 30 per cent and the more 
frequent use of non-traditional reasons can be evaluated as a new type of judicial 
thinking which is in line with the values and principles of the legal system of the 
EU. The new model of self-understanding of judges seems to be more sensitive to 
protection of rights than the one that existed before the EU accession. 
 Before declaring the Europeanisation of the judicial reasoning too soon we have 
to examine the deeper layers of the collected data. The reference to the category of 
 ‘ other EU law ’ is the highest by far amongst all EU law arguments (82.3 per cent). 
References to particular provisions of EU directives, regulations and ECJ judg-
ments (or references to the  ‘ jurisprudence of ECJ ’ as such) were included in this 
category. The character of these  ‘ written ’ EU law arguments is very similar to the 
traditional domestic legal rules and judicial practice. In some cases a judge has to 
deal with  ‘ black letter laws ’ of the EU that can be considered as the  ‘ most locally 
applicable rules ’ . Applying the  ‘ written EU law ’ is not a signifi cant challenge for 
a trained judge; it does not require to be engaged in the discussions concerning 
legitimate policies, values and interest behind the text of the (EU) law ( ‘ unwritten ’ 
elements of EU law). Products of EU legislation and ECJ judgments can be used 
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 ‘ mechanically ’ , that is, in a very formalistic manner even when the appropriate 
application of the particular EU legal materials demand the opposite (argumenta-
tive, refl ective and consequence-orientated) judicial style. 
 Moreover, frequent references to EU law can be used for strategic reasons: The 
judge tries to present his or her controversial (or arbitrary) decision as a logical 
deduction from the written law. In doing so they may benefi t from the new legal 
arguments (EU law) at hand. 17 Another point of strategic application of EU law 
amongst Hungarian judges may be that using the preliminary ruling procedure 
an ordinary judge can  ‘ skip ’ the constitutional review of the  Alkotm á nyb í r ó s á g 
(Hungarian Constitutional Court, hereinafter  ‘ AB ’ ) which has the competence to 
review the judgments of ordinary courts since 2012. Ordinary courts may try to 
strengthen their position against the AB in this way. 18 
 There is another reason for strategic use of EU values: According to an earlier 
study non-traditional arguments in the judge ’ s written opinion do not add any 
extra value to the line of classical legal reasons in many cases. The new model legal 
arguments serve as  ‘ ornaments ’ or  ‘ decorum ’ in the reasoning of the judgment. 19 
EU law values may share this fate also. 
 Another striking fi gure is  ‘ zero reference ’ to the EU law proportionality prin-
ciple, since this principle is one of the key features of effective judicial review 
according to EU law and to the jurisprudence of ECtHR. 20 Although judges refer 
to the proportionality principle in cases without European context in 23.1 per cent 
of all pro-constitutional arguments, experts warn that Hungarian courts do not 
use the proportionality test in the way the ECJ or ECtHR use it. Hungarian judges 
examine only whether the administrative agency exercises its discretional power in 
a  ‘ reasonable ’ way and they do not tend to judge the agency ’ s discretional decision 
on merit. Where judges refer to the proportionality rule in the examined cases, 
they, predominantly, simply state that the administrative agency took (or did 
not take) all relevant circumstances of the case into consideration. They seem to 
ignore the broader policy and governance context of the case when making their 
decision in question of proportionality. As Kov á cs and Varju put it: 
 The introduction of [genuine] proportionality to replace unreasonableness as a general 
principle in determining the intensity of judicial review in Hungarian administrative law 
 17  I  Bartha and  M  Bencze ,  ‘ Az eur ó pai jog alkalmaz á sa a magyar b í r ó i  í t é lkez é sben 2004  é s 2007 
k ö z ö tt ’ [Enforcement of EU law in the Hungarian adjudication between 2004 and 2007] in  P  M á t é (ed), 
 Eur ó pai jog  é s jogfi loz ó fi a. Konferenciatanulm á nyok az eur ó pai integr á ci ó  ö tvenedik  é vfordul ó j á nak 
 ü nnep é re ( Szent Istv á n T á rsulat ,  2008 ) . 
 18  Lively debates between the Legfels ő bb B í r ó s á g (Hungarian Supreme Court before the establish-
ment of the K ú ria, hereinafter  ‘ LB ’ ) and the AB on the question of  ‘ who determines the Hungarian 
judicial practice ultimately? ’ have already taken place in the early 1990s in Hungary. See  M  Szab ó , 
 ‘ Change of Legal Thought in Hungary 1990 – 2005 ’ in  A  Jakab ,  P  Tak á cs and  AF  Tatham (eds),  The 
Transformation of the Hungarian Legal Order 1985 – 2005 ( Kluwer Law International ,  2007 )  600 – 01 . 
 19  M  Bencze ,  ‘ D í sz í t ő elem,  á lc á z ó h á l ó vagy tart ó oszlop? A magyar b ü ntet ő b í r ó i gyakorlat viszonya 
az alkotm á nyhoz ’ [Enforcement of the Constitution in the Hungarian adjudication in criminal cases] 
( 2007 )  Fundamentum  3, 5 – 21 . 
 20  See also below,  ch 9 in this vol. 
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would require the reassessment of current doctrine and the reconsideration of the role 
of courts in the scrutiny of administrative discretion. 21 
 C. Czech Republic 
 The Czech Republic presents in some ways a unique case study for the period 2005 
to 2013. Prior to 2003 the Czech administrative judiciary had been a plethora of 
eight regional courts without a high court at the top which would unify their con-
fl icting case law. In 2003 the Czech administrative judicial system was transformed 
by establishing a new institution of the  Nejvy š š í spr á vn í soud (Supreme Adminis-
trative Court, hereinafter  ‘ NSS ’ ). In our previous analysis we covered the period 
until 2004; by then the number of decisions of the NSS in our sample remained 
pretty low and did not affect the overall results of our study. Unlike the previous 
study, the published case law between 2005 and 2013 is dominated by decisions 
of the NSS (they make approximately nine out of 10 cases in our sample). Our 
research therefore covers a decisive part of the development of the NSS in its fi rst 
decade (2003 – 2013). 
 In its fi rst few years, the NSS suffered from the fl ood of cases and many vacan-
cies in the judicial personnel. The NSS started in 2003 with less than half the 
number of judges sitting in the NSS in 2014 (originally 13 as opposed to 30 
today). In the fi rst few months of 2003, judges were not supported by any law 
clerks. Not surprisingly, many delays and backlogs followed. This had an impact 
on the quality of the earliest judgments of the NSS. Judgments remained very 
short, they included just the very basic framework of textual analysis of the law. 
Purposive argumentation as well as any other argumentation external to law was 
largely missing. 
 In around 2006 the situation shifted. That year the NSS moved into a new 
 modern building, judges were equipped with new technologies. The num-
ber of judges doubled and reached almost 30, thus making the workload more 
 manageable. Every judge hired a second law clerk. A new comparative law section 
of the NSS was established, one of its functions preparing comparative analysis for 
judges when facing cases with EU or foreign law elements. This section is com-
posed of young lawyers, recent law school graduates, fl uent in many languages 
(besides those frequently spoken Polish, Spanish and Italian are also represented 
here). Interestingly, judges do not hesitate to use the output of the comparative 
analysis while justifying their verdicts. 
 The NSS, composed of 30 judges today (2014), is rather small if compared to 
its European counterparts. It includes both career judges and judges coming from 
other legal professions (bureaucracy, private fi rms, academia). The former group 
now makes less than half of the NSS. Being composed of judges with different 
 21  Ibid. 
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professional backgrounds the NSS is much more diverse than the Czech  Nejvy š š í 
soud (Czech Supreme Court, hereinafter  ‘ NS ’ ). 
 At the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century it can be said that the Czech judi-
ciary does not use a single style which would unite constitutional, administra-
tive and general judiciary. Even within one single NSS one can fi nd more styles, 
which do relate to personalities of judges who write the opinion. However, if 
we shall simplify, the civil and criminal judiciary represented by the NS stays 
closer to the cognitive and formalistic ideal of legalistic argumentation which 
used to dominate Czech law until the 1990s. This ideal is linked to openly formal-
istic and mostly brief opinion, without accepting interpretational alternatives. 
The disadvantage of this rather conservative style is a limited persuasiveness. Its 
reader does not know how the court addressed the arguments which called for 
an alternative approach. The decisions retain their legalistic fa ç ade, the judge 
presents his view as if he or she were a  ‘ subsumption ’ automaton, without show-
ing reasons why they chose one premise over another. The decisive reason of the 
correctness of judicial interpretation is the hierarchical position of the NS within 
a judicial system. 
 In contrast, the development of a different style of the administrative judiciary 
accelerated after 2004 (the year when we fi nished our fi rst research). It followed 
the patterns developed in the 1990s by the  Ú stavn í soud (Czech Constitutional 
Court, hereinafter  ‘ Ú S ’ ). After all, as we mentioned in the fi rst study, it was the 
 Ú S which effectively served as a substitute to the non-existent NSS until 2003, 
unifying the case law of regional administrative courts. That is why such a high 
percentage of constitutional reasoning in the administrative judiciary of the Czech 
Republic as early as the late 1990s. 
 Today the decisions of the NSS and often also regional administrative courts 
are written in a dialogical and discursive style, their length increases every year. 
Judges are often trying hard to deal with all alternatives of the interpretation of a 
particular legal problem. The nature of reasoning is quite often substantive, it is 
openly accepted that the law has more than just one possible meaning. Judges are 
seeking to fi nd all the reasons why the interpretation chosen by the court is the 
correct one; sometimes judges are so open that they make it explicit that multiple 
interpretations are possible, and then they give their reasons why the outcome is 
the best one. Although the rank of the NSS within a judicial hierarchy matters 
(the court is correct because it is fi nal), the NSS tries to legitimise its reasoning by 
sincere attempts to persuade the readers. The disadvantage of this style is its length 
and diffuseness. 
 Both styles, the legalistic style of the NS and dialogical of the NSS do coexist in 
the same legal culture. That is why it is premature to say which one would prevail 
in a longer run. It remains to be seen whether a longer decision with more rea-
sons is more persuasive within a civilian legal culture, or whether the judiciary by 
doing this is not losing part of its (fi ctitious but publicly important) legitimacy 
of the institution endowed by the knowledge of the  ‘ objective ’ truth of the law ’ s 
interpretation. 
 59EU Law and Central European Judges
 Against this backdrop one must interpret the changes visible in our sample data 
since 2007. The average length of the judgment multiplied, say from two or three 
pages in the 1990s and the early 2000s to 10 or 12 pages in the late 2000s and the 
early 2010s. The judgment is now supposed to address all arguments presented 
by all parties to the procedure. It is not just the judge ’ s authority which decides 
the case. Instead this is the judicial authority combined with the sincere and open 
dialogue with both parties which both decide the case. If this is true for many deci-
sions dealing with hard cases, it is even more applicable for the decisions of the 
grand chamber of the NSS, which is supposed to unify the case law of the NSS. 22 
As a rule, decisions of the grand chamber are openly dialogical, they deal with 
all interpretational alternatives and are explicitly based on weighing substantive 
reasons. 
 Since the 1990s a rather frequent use of external arguments, especially if com-
pared with Poland and Hungary, has continued. Those arguments are quite often 
substantive and value-driven. The more visible rise of non-formalist argumenta-
tion, as represented in our graphs through  ‘ values external to law ’ , started in 2006 
and accelerated since 2007. Unlike the situation until 2006, more recent judgments 
do approach hard cases in a much more transparent way, using teleological or 
purposive argumentation routinely. The relatively smaller number of references to 
legislative history, especially if compared to Poland (a Czech judge is almost three 
times less likely to refer to legislative history than his Polish counterpart), relates 
to the fact that Czech  travaux preparatoires are notoriously infamous for being of 
very poor quality, usually lacking any substantial information. In contrast, the use 
of purposive argumentation (often called objective teleological argumentation: 
The law ’ s purpose as envisaged by the interpreter) is now a standard exercise of 
Czech administrative judges. 
 EU law arguments come most often from VAT cases, customs law, some areas 
of environmental law and competition law, which is also the case in the two other 
countries. Cases where EU law is directly applicable have been decided by the NSS 
since the end of the fi rst decade of this century, taking into account the delay 
between facts of the case, subsequent administrative procedure and fi nally judicial 
proceedings. It is generally possible to say that the judges of the NSS, supported in 
their research by the numerous professional staff and comparative apparatus and 
two law clerks, are inclined to address EU law arguments more often than lower 
administrative judges. For the latter it is still in some way a luxury for which they 
often lack time, resources and energy. After all, almost all preliminary references 
to the Court of Justice were made by the NSS rather than by lower administra-
tive courts. The use of EU law arguments is quite often urged by the parties. In 
some other cases the parties try to argue against the use of EU law if the result is 
 22  The NSS routinely decides in three judges chambers. The grand chamber is composed of seven 
judges and is supposed to issue verdicts binding for the entire court if the case law is confl icting or a 
regular chamber wants to deviate from the earlier case law. 
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unwelcome. Often the parties try to set aside EU law by referring to the domestic 
constitutional law which is allegedly in confl ict with EU law (such as the abuse of 
rights, carousel frauds in VAT etc). And yet in some different cases ignorant par-
ties do not argue by EU law and the judge would invoke the argument on her own 
motion (typically if the parties ’ submission brought the general legal argument 
which has also its EU law underpinning). 
 Whether or not the use of EU law is a sign of anti-formalism is diffi cult to say. 
The use of EU law is in many cases anti-formalistic (if general principles or other 
open-ended standards of EU law are applied as well as EU law harmonising argu-
ments). However, as already discussed above in relation to Hungary, it can easily 
become the exercise of overt formalism, though, especially if judges unthinkably 
do recite some abstract or unrelated EU rules which then serve as a fa ç ade for the 
result reached in a different way. 
 Czech judges do tend to quote legal literature much less frequently than the Pol-
ish courts but much more frequently than their Hungarian counterparts. Among 
published cases 3.5 per cent of judgments did refer to scholarly work, whereas in 
Poland the number is more than three times higher (11.4 per cent). In contrast, 
Hungarian judges almost never quote legal literature (0.3 per cent). The Czech 
legal culture historically belongs to the Germanic legal family where the role of 
legal academia has been always very important (in Germany often referred to as 
professorial style of law). Thus, the current situation when the Czech judges do 
not view legal academics as a meaningful support for their task of interpreting the 
law is part of the continuing failure of the domestic legal academia to provide an 
impetus to judge-made law. 
 Recently (say since 2010 or 2011) we can see to some extent a reverse 
 phenomenon and the return to a different style of formalism. Also this is visible 
in our tables as the rise of values internal to law after 2010. This rise of formalist 
arguments is not the move back to statutory textualism. Instead, it is accompanied 
by the rise of the role of the earlier case law (case law formalism). 23 Whereas in 
the earliest years the judgments seldom referred to precedent as there was literally 
nothing (we remind our readers that the NSS started to operate in 2003 and the 
fi rst year it issued few judgments), recently one can hardly fi nd a decision which 
would not quote at least one earlier precedent. In many judgments the number 
of cited precedents is much higher, though, and it often happens that the number 
of cases used and quoted is in two digits. Unlike Hungary, the NSS always gives a 
proper citation so the reader might fi nd the source of argument. So far so good, 
the proper quotation of the arguments used by the NSS makes the judicial argu-
mentation more transparent and open to criticism. 
 On the other hand, NSS ’ s argumentation is becoming more self-referential 
and sometimes even sterile because all arguments seem to be embedded in the 
 23  Signs of case law formalism are also present in Hungary, see Z Z ő di,  ‘ Analysis of Citation 
Patterns of Hungarian Judicial Decisions ’ , online at  < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2410070 > , 26. 
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earlier cases. The law ’ s reason is often lost under the surface of texts separated 
from their factual environment in the earlier case law. Interestingly, this new wave 
of formalism sometimes buries even contrary text of the amended law — judges 
applying the earlier case law simply would not notice that the interpreted law 
itself had been amended. In fact, the way we conducted our research underesti-
mates this new phenomenon as it includes cases which have been meant by their 
authors as being at least in some way novel. Many other cases which shall have 
been interpreted in a non-trivial fashion, all things considered, are often decided 
mechanically, just referring to the earlier case law which however was dealing with 
a different factual scenario. These cases would remain unpublished. 
 D. General Evaluation of Adjudicative Style of CEE Countries 
 i. The Direct Impact of EU Accession 
 The research results set out in the previous section point to several noticeable 
trends in CEE administrative courts ’ argumentation practice. First, an obvious 
trend is the signifi cant rise in references to EU law arguments, which, in each 
of the countries examined, was several hundred per cent. This direct effect of 
the accession is easy to explain — together with the accession, EU law became 
an element of the internal legal system of Member States and references to this 
law have over time become similar to references to internal law values. This is 
particularly true in the case of adjudications relating to customs and tax law, 
especially in cases involving VAT or excise duty. The impact of the accession 
is not limited to EU law-related issues but it stretches also into purely domes-
tic cases. In the case of Poland and the Czech Republic, the most frequently 
(in Hungary the second most frequently) cited argument in the EU law val-
ues group is the principle of interpretation of domestic law in accordance with 
EU law. This type of argument is not a typical internal or  ‘ written ’ argument 
that is applied automatically, as it requires from the judge a complex process of 
argumentation which is unique in each case. The substantial rise in the appli-
cation of pro-Union interpretations could therefore be regarded as a serious 
change in the adjudicating culture of judges in CEE. This type of argumenta-
tion is structurally different from the arguments used in the past and conse-
quently is something new in judicial practice, which cannot be said of specifi c 
EU law regulations being applied in a manner similar to the current application 
of domestic provisions. 
 ii. The Indirect Impact of the EU Accession 
 In addition to the rather obvious direct impact of EU law on the spectrum 
of arguments used by judges in CEE, our research also shows the occurrence of 
an indirect impact. First, we observed a signifi cant increase in the number of 
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referred reasons per judgments in comparison to the previously examined period 
(see table 4 below). 
 Table 4. Comparison of number of arguments per judgment of the currently examined 
period to the previous period 
 Number of arguments 
per judgment 
 Poland  Hungary  Czech 
 1999 – 2004  3.5  1.92  3.53 
 2005 – 2013  5.4  3  7.6 
 Change  54 %  36 %  115 % 
 It can be assumed that the more reasons a judge uses in a case, the more persuasive 
his decision becomes. We believe this is a sign of a greater understanding of the 
needs of the external stakeholders, like the parties to the case, their representatives 
and wider public audience that can better understand the grounds of a particular 
verdict. 
 Second, compared to the results of the study carried out for the years 1999 to 
2004, there has been a drop in the number of references to internal law arguments 
together with a change in the frequency of using non-formalistic arguments other 
than those of the EU law. This specifi cally applies to constitutional arguments, 
though to a lesser degree, arguments based on values external to a law, such as its 
aim or function of laws. 
 The fall in the number of references to internal arguments, particularly the 
lower proportion with which linguistic interpretation is used (a 10 to 15 per cent 
drop, depending on the country), may be an indication of the deformalisation of 
administrative court judgments. Of course, to a certain extent this change corre-
sponds to the greater number of references to EU law arguments. These references 
have in many cases, especially in tax cases, replaced references to internal argu-
ments. This is why, in order to show deformalisation tendencies in administrative 
case law, it is necessary to point out other changes, particularly as regards the fre-
quency of references to constitutional and external arguments. 
 As indicated in the paper setting out our research for the years 1999 to 2004, 
constitutional argumentation shows that judges are willing, in a specifi c judgment, 
to apply principles of law understood to be general, unspecifi ed standards. This 
willingness goes against the formalistic approach, which centres on the applica-
tion of bright-line rules and is adverse to argumentation based on principles and 
standards thus requiring judges to take important axiological decisions. Under 
formalism these decisions are reserved for the legislator and it is deemed that the 
application of principles by a judge leads to a great risk of unbridled decision 
making discretion. 
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 However, taking into account values such as the aim or function of law is, to 
our mind, proof that judges ’ awareness goes beyond the letter of the law to cover 
how application of the law affects society and the economy. In our view, the fact 
that EU law is clearly rooted in the idea of economic, social and even cultural 
integration naturally requires that in many cases related to EU law judges have to 
consider the relationship between the law and society and its development. There 
is no doubt that a functional and teleological interpretation based for example 
on the analysis of the themes in European directives, is a key element in applying 
European law. Consequently, it may be deemed that acceptance of this by judges 
leads to greater willingness to apply internal law functionally and teleologically. 
The application of values external to law is therefore proof of a departure from 
the formalistic tendencies that decry the use of extra-textual values in judicial 
argumentation. 
 In both areas of judicial activity discussed, our research shows that changes have 
taken place since our study of the years 1999 to 2004. In both Poland and Hungary 
the increase in the frequency of references to constitutional values is impressive —
 an almost 50 per cent rise in Hungary and a 30 per cent rise in Poland. Data on 
the Czech Republic do not support this trend, though it should be noted that in 
the 1999 – 2004 results judgments passed by Czech courts were the least formalistic 
of the three countries examined (and were in direct interactions with the  Ú stavn í 
soud which served as a sort of substitute to the then non-existent high administra-
tive court). Thus it could be said that the willingness to apply the Constitution, 
promoted by the infl uential  Ú S, has remained stable and at a relatively high level 
in the Czech Republic. 
 Among the constitutional references in all the countries examined, at the fore-
front are references to generally understood constitutional rights and freedoms 
without them being specifi ed by judges. This may show that the constitutional 
awareness of the judiciary in administrative courts is relatively low and is lim-
ited to an awareness that constitutional rights and freedoms should be taken into 
account in judgments, though this is not based on an in-depth analysis of the 
functions and relevance of individual constitutional principles. Hungarian judges 
are an exception in this respect. In their judgments almost quarter of all references 
to the Constitution are references to the proportionality principle. This principle 
plays a key role in assessing whether it is reasonable for the administration to 
interfere in the lives of citizens, thus it is also certain that this popularity among 
administrative court judges should become a role model. A similar role in the 
Czech case is played by the due process clause which guarantees the right to fair 
trial (Article 36 of the Czech Bill of Rights). This clause serves as a sort of default 
rule which generates constitutional reasoning if no more clear rights are available. 
When a Czech lawyer does not have another constitutional provision to use she 
would simply refer to Article 36. Both the Czech NSS and the  Ú S use this funda-
mental right for both procedural and substantive law errors before the ordinary 
courts. 
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 Although there has been an increase in the number of references to external 
values in Hungary and the Czech Republic (a rise of about 20 – 30 per cent in both 
countries), no such increase can be seen in Poland. The most popular of the exter-
nal values are references to the aim and function of the law and also to the legisla-
tor ’ s intent. Note should be taken of the occurrence in judicial argumentation of 
references to a principle that is of key importance for citizens — that of  in dubio pro 
libertate (if in doubt, adjudicate in favour of freedom of permitted action), which 
we found little evidence of in our study of the years 1999 to 2004. Our current 
research shows that it is becoming increasingly popular to apply this principle in 
Hungary and in the Czech Republic. 
 A useful summary of the interpretation of our research results is given in one 
more table, illustrating the spectrum of values referred to by judges in a single 
judgment. 
 Table 5. Combinations of arguments per judgment (proportions of the same 
combinations as found in the previously examined period are in brackets) 
 All Poland (400) 
 Intern  Const/
Intern 
 Intern/
Extern 
 Const/Intern/
Extern 
 EU/
Intern 
 Other  Total 
 165  60  60  45  30  39  399 
 41.4 % 
(60.8 % ) 
 15.0 % 
(10.0 % ) 
 15.0 % 
(19.8 % ) 
 11.3 % (5.6 % )  7.5 %  9.8 %  100 % 
 All Hungary (358) 
 Intern  Intern/
Extern 
 EU/
Intern 
 Const/
Intern 
 EU/Intern/
Extern 
 Other  Total 
 187  63  50  15  22  21  358 
 52.2 % 
(82.4 % ) 
 17.6 % 
(12.2 % ) 
 14.0 %  4.2 % 
(3.0 % ) 
 6.1 %  5.9 %  100.0 % 
 All Czech Republic (180) 
 Intern  Intern/
Extern 
 Const/Intern/
Extern 
 EU/Intern/
Extern 
 EU/Const/
Intern/Extern 
 Other  Total 
 31  77  29  22  18  3  180 
 17.2 % 
(41.8 % ) 
 42.8 % 
(33 % ) 
 16.1 % (9.4 % )  12.2 %  10.0 %  1.7 %  100.0 % 
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 This table shows,  inter alia , how many administrative cases are adjudicated by judges 
solely on the basis of formalistic (internal) arguments, and in how many cases other values 
play a part. In our view, a good judgment should be justifi ed using a whole range of inter-
pretations and therefore the cogency of a linguistic interpretation should be supported by 
a functional, pro-Union and pro-constitutional interpretation. Thus the fall in the number 
of judgments based solely on internal values should be seen as a positive change in how 
administrative court judges adjudicate. The table above shows this fall — at present fewer 
than half of all administrative court judgments are based solely on internal argumentation, 
which we deem formalistic, while the study of the years 1999 to 2004 indicated that as many 
as two thirds of judgments did not use any external, constitutional or EU arguments (for 
example Poland). We regard this change as one of the most noticeable pieces of evidence of 
the evolution that administrative judgments have undergone in CEE due to the accession 
of countries in the region to the European Union. 
 iii. Some Doubts about Deformalisation 
 We have been witnessing recently a considerable change in the proportion of EU 
law arguments in judgments delivered by CEE judges. Nonetheless, the higher pro-
portion of using written EU law arguments in reasoning is a natural consequence 
of the EU accession and it is not necessary a sign of the Europeanisation of the 
judicial thought. As EU law is being more and more developed the number of its 
specifi c and directly applicable norms are increasing accordingly. Provisions of EU 
law therefore, as we indicated above, can also become the  ‘ most locally applicable 
rules ’ . 24 Besides that national higher courts gradually build a bunch of precedents 
around cases related to EU law which can determine the direction of adjudica-
tion in future cases and, at the same time, it can make judicial practice rigid and 
 infl exible ( ‘ case law formalism ’ ). It is a realistic possibility that many judges choose 
the formalistic way of applying EU law without refl ecting the policy considera-
tions, values and purposes behind the text of EU law. Using the text of EU law 
without accepting the judicial thinking of the Court of Justice and the ECtHR will 
not serve the purpose of the deepening European integration. 
 Formalistic application of EU law is strengthened by one of the characteristic 
developments in the past two decades in CEE countries, namely the  ‘ politicisation 
of adjudication ’ . This means that courts played the role of the arbitrator, more 
and more frequently, in cases having political implications. It is obvious that it 
is the constitutional courts, in the fi rst place, which represent this type of self-
understanding . Nonetheless the effort of the courts to extend their political com-
petence has caused heavy criticism amongst politicians and other stakeholders and 
statutory restriction of the power of constitutional courts has become a realistic 
 24  It is worth noting that the question of correct interpretation of EU norms which frequently 
requires serious effort from the judge (exploring the social backgrounds and complex political aims 
behind the applicable norm) has to be differentiated from the problem of formalistic application of EU 
arguments which is also possible (there is no legal system fully protected from formalistic adjudication). 
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 opportunity. 25 Ordinary courts may therefore hope they can avoid that kind of 
criticism if they show a minimalist approach in deciding issues having any politi-
cal implications. A law-applier bureaucrat serves better this institutional goal than 
a Dworkinain  ‘ Hercules ’ who protects the rights of the individual against state 
intervention under any circumstances. This sociological explanation also suggests 
that  under uncertain political circumstances , particularly in young and relatively 
weak democracies, courts try to remain strictly minimalist and refrain themselves 
in discussing cases with political implication. This judicial strategy can support the 
formalistic judicial style. 26 To sum it up although formalist adjudicative  strategy 
has a detrimental effect on the quality of the reasoning it still may have some 
positive impact on the institutional position of the courts in the political arena. 
 There is another factor which pushes judges toward treating EU law in a 
 formalistic way. The workload of judges which is commonly considered as a 
heavy burden on them has not decreased signifi cantly since our previously stud-
ied period (1999 – 2004). It goes without saying that there is a steady and strong 
pressure on judges from both public audience and courts leaders to resolve legal 
cases as fast as possible. As the time of fi nishing cases is a measurable and easily 
controllable criterion when evaluating judicial activities, judges pay more atten-
tion to timeliness than to construing a well-founded and refl ective legal reasoning 
which would be essential in applying EU law otherwise. The reason we can still be 
optimistic about the future of CEE adjudication is that the increase in the number 
of EU law arguments was followed by a similar increase in the references to other 
non-traditional arguments (with the exception of constitutional law arguments 
in the Czech Republic). These data indicate that judges tend to take into consid-
eration the wider legal (constitutional arguments) and social (values external to 
law) context of cases before them. This judicial approach necessarily presupposes 
a certain level of awareness of deeper layers of law even if non-traditional argu-
ments are often referred fi rst by involved parties and judges only refl ect to those 
arguments in the reasoning. 
 iv. Risks of Non-formalism and Strategic Formalism 
 Examining and evaluating the developments of application of EU law in CEE 
countries cannot be completed without taking the broader context of enforce-
ment of rule of law into consideration. From this aspect fi delity to traditional 
legal arguments has its own advantages. In easy cases where the content of the 
written law is obvious and it is clear what the law requires from the addressees (or 
where originally unclear law has been interpreted by established case law), it can 
 25  Á  Kov á cs ,  ‘ Sz ü ks é g van-e alkotm á nyb í r ó s á gra? Instrument á lis  é rvek a t ö rv é nyhoz á s b í r ó i kon-
trollja mellett ’ [Do we need constitutional courts? An instrumentalist approach on the judicial control 
of the legislature] ( 2013 )  68 ( 5 )  Jogtudom á nyi K ö zl ö ny  243 . 
 26  For detailed discussion of this sociological framework see  PH  Solomon ,  ‘ Courts and Judges in 
Authoritarian Regimes ’ ( 2007 )  60  World Politics  122 . 
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be  dangerous to make judicial decisions based on uncertain and vague principles, 
values or extra-legal factors even if such a decision seems to be right. Some argue 
that in cases where we would have good reasons to deviate from the plain meaning 
of the text we should avoid doing this: A fallible human decision maker does better 
if she or he treats the legal text as a reliable indicator of the intention of legislator. 27 
 Spreading of non-formalism and strategic formalism (in the latter case the 
 decision,  per defi nitionem , is not driven by the text of the law either) without 
 reasonable limits on it certainly threatens the rule of law as it may violate the 
requirement of transparency and thus, it may expose the adjudication to illegiti-
mate infl uencing factors (pressure group ’ s interests, political party ’ s intentions 
etc). In analysing the selected judgments we found some dubious arguments 
which may disguise the actual reasons behind the judgment. 
 As for the strategic formalism, we realised that Hungarian judges, unlike their 
Polish and Czech colleagues, prefer using the token argument of  ‘ judicial practice ’ 
without any clarifi cation and without mentioning any concrete previous decision. 
Furthermore, in certain Hungarian cases we found references to vague categories 
such as  ‘ the conviction of the court ’ serving as the basis of the decision without 
any further specifi cation. These kinds of arguments do not meet the requirement 
of transparent legal reasoning as neither the affected parties nor the wider public 
audience are aware of the true reasons behind the decision of the judge. 28 A  serious 
disadvantage of such a style of legal reasoning is that it may weaken the convincing 
force of the judgments and consequently the public trust in courts as well. 
 As further evidence of this approach we found reference to the  ‘ legal practice 
of the administrative agency ’ in a case where the very practice of the competent 
administrative agency was questionable. That is a good example of how judges, 
under the umbrella of a seemingly formalistic argumentation, can defend the so-
called state-interest ( ‘ raison d ’ etat ’ ) instead of protecting the right of conduct-
ing free commercial activities. 29 It is a commonly received view that one of the 
 27  A  Vermeule ,  Judging Under Uncertainty:  An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation ( Harvard 
University Press ,  2006 )  63 – 85 . 
 28  One telling example from Hungary is the case (BH 2006. 376) where the Custom Agency imposed 
a relatively high fi ne on a wine producer who failed to report, on time, offi cially that a part of their wine 
stock was ruined because of a leak in one of his wine tanks. According to the relevant law he should 
have reported the change  ‘ at the time of the event [of the damage] ’ . The misfortune occurred at 8am 
and the producer wanted to report the event at the end of the working hours (after the necessary and 
urgent work, in order to reduce damages to the minimum, was done). LB said that the referred text of 
the law does not require immediate report from the plaintiff, but the court did not explain how it had 
come to that conclusion. In our opinion, the arguments would have been complete if the court had 
referred to the proportionality principle since, taking into consideration the special circumstances of 
the situation, the immediate obligation to report the damage would have put an extreme burden on 
the wine producer. 
 29  This is not to question that legal practice of a governmental agency has been an established 
 German category which is here primarily to protect interests of the parties to administrative pro-
ceedings. The corresponding principle prohibits deviating from this practice unless good reasons are 
offered. 
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main characteristics of the so-called Socialist legal system is the  ‘ reversed hierarchy 
of legal norms ’ . That means that judges and administrators prefer applying the 
most detailed directives (ordinances, opinions, circular letters etc), even if they 
did not count as  ‘ hard law ’ . As a consequence of this a  ‘ state-friendly ’ approach was 
clearly detectable in two other cases, where the court held the disagreement of two 
administrative agencies against the business entity. 30 
 Non-formalist argumentation also can go against the values of the rule of law. 
If a judge just refers to a certain constitutional principle or a human right (or as 
we saw it in one Hungarian case: To the  ‘ the moral judgments of the society ’ ) as a 
reason for his decision and does not put that argument in its proper constitutional 
context or ignores the particular circumstances of the case when she or he delivers 
a judgment, this also can be a breach of his or her duty. 31 
 The answer to the question of which adjudicative style serves better the enforce-
ment of the rule of law and the interest of the whole political community may 
depend on the type of cases to be decided. A judge has to have the necessary  ‘ judi-
cial wisdom ’ to decide when she or he has to apply an innovative, new solution and 
when she or he has to remain loyal to the text of the law. Although judicial wisdom 
cannot be acquired from books, there are some institutional solutions which can 
help judges recognise the broader context of their decisions as well as making the 
process of judicial thinking more refl ective. One of them is having more balanced 
courts, composed not only of career judges but also of the outsiders to the judici-
ary, having experience from other fi elds of life than the judiciary. 
 V. Conclusions 
 In our previous study we stated that due to the strong formalist tradition CEE 
judges may need some time to fully adjust their judicial decision making style 
to the new legal environment resulting from the EU accession. In this chapter 
we presented the results of an analysis of more than 900 administrative judicial 
 30  In one of these cases (BH 2006. 137) the Building Authority gave permission to an entrepreneur 
to build a factory on its own land. After that the Land Registry Agency imposed a fi ne on the entrepre-
neur because he did not ask for a licence to build premises in an agricultural area. 
 31  We have a Hungarian example (LB Kfv.II.39.166/2007) for this attitude (this administrative judg-
ment is not one of the examined cases): In the early 1990s a church building was built in the centre of 
a residential district of a Hungarian town. After its opening, residents were subject every morning —
 including weekends — to a long-lasting and very loud chiming starting at six o ’ clock. After some unsuc-
cessful meetings with the representatives of the Catholic Church, the residents brought the case to the 
competent administrative agency which ordered reasonable decrease in chiming in terms of volume 
and period. The Church then challenged this decision before the court in 2007. The court quashed the 
decision of the agency stating that the expression of religious convictions is protected by the constitu-
tion and chiming, without any doubt, qualifi es as such. The court did not make any effort to explain 
why residents ’ right to a healthy environment was irrelevant in that case (ignoring the constitutional 
context), and also overlooked  ‘ the most locally applicable rule ’ , namely the ministerial decree on pro-
tecting citizens from noisy activities (ignoring the particular circumstances of the case). 
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decisions from three CEE countries, dated from 2005 to 2013. Based on our quan-
titative analysis we can certainly declare that signifi cant changes have occurred 
in the judicial style of administrative courts since 2005. Our data clearly show 
that judges of the CEE countries have used more non-formalistic, non-traditional 
arguments (pro-constitutional, pro-EU reasons and values external to law) in the 
examined period than they used before the EU accession. These fi ndings allowed 
us to argue that the EU accession has both direct and indirect infl uence on judicial 
behaviour in CEE countries. 
 This shift is a clear sign of departure from the classical  ‘ French judicial style ’ 
to a reasoning which serves as genuine guidance for both the parties and other 
judges in deciding similar cases. Using non-formalistic arguments in an increas-
ing number does not only result in a change of the  ‘ language of judicial reasoning ’ 
but may be an indicator of a change of judicial thinking. The more arguments 
a judge considers in the reasoning the more the chance of socially sensitive, 
 problem-orientated and open-minded decision making. This kind of judicial 
thinking is of special importance in administrative cases where there is an asym-
metry in strength between the litigious parties. 
 One of the reasons for this shift is obviously the EU accession — together with 
EU membership, EU law became an element of the internal legal system of Mem-
ber States and references to this law have over time become similar to references 
to internal law values. 32 In addition to that we could be witnesses of the process of 
 ‘ internationalisation of adjudication ’ . In the past decades many international judi-
cial associations, as well as formal and informal networks of judges have emerged. 
CEE judges, therefore, currently have many transborder opportunities to learn 
something new, educate themselves, take part in conferences and communicate to 
each other in various ways. 
 We cannot overestimate the impact of the information technology (especially 
that of the internet) on the everyday judicial work, as well. Numerous professional 
and open-access databases facilitate the exploration of the relevant case-law, litera-
ture or other necessary legal materials when a judge discusses a diffi cult case. The 
internet makes it also easier to ask for or give advice. 
 Besides that we must remember that since the political transition a brand new 
generation of lawyers (judges) has been growing up. Many of them speak for-
eign language(s), took part in the Erasmus program, learnt comparative law at the 
universities and they are familiar with the jurisprudence of the ECJ, ECtHR and 
their own national constitutional court, too. It is not a surprise therefore that, as 
opposed to their ancestors, they are willing to accept non-formalistic arguments 
in their legal reasoning. 
 32  However, we were warned by senior judges that similarly signifi cant changes might not occur 
in  ‘ traditional ’ fi elds of the adjudication (civil and criminal cases). The reason for this is that admin-
istrative law is the legal branch most exposed to the infl uence of EU law while other branches of law 
preserve their own national characteristics. 
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 However we have to be careful in relying on empirical data in evaluating the 
developments of the adjudicative style in CEE countries. Some fi ndings of the 
qualitative content analysis have indicated that the spectacular increasing in the 
numbers is neither necessarily in straight correlation with improving the quality 
of adjudication nor does it mean the reception of self-understanding of Western 
judges. 
 We saw some cases of abusing of non-formalistic arguments. Vague categories, 
for example, as decisive reasons do not meet the requirement of transparent legal 
reasoning. Furthermore, a special version of formalism (strategic formalism) 
seems to survive or even acquire new forms (case law formalism). This causes 
problems if judges apply these kinds of formalist strategies systematically in 
deciding hard cases. Such a problem can be that formalism may strengthen the 
 ‘ law-applier ’ mentality which does not take the protection of rights of the plain-
tiffs seriously. This attitude may lead to the emergence of a non-conscious state-
friendly  ‘ default setting ’ in deciding administrative cases. 
 To sum it up: Despite the above-described signs of deformalisation, the for-
malism of administrative judiciaries is not fully dead, especially in its new 
form — ‘ case-law formalism ’ . A possible explanation of its persistence (besides the 
steady pressure on judges to fi nish their cases as fast as possible) may be that in 
young and relatively weak democracies courts try to remain strictly minimalist in 
discussing cases with political implications and administrative cases often have 
such implications. 
 

